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is p ea ing, es imony or o erwise in court at a contract
for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under
this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and
accepted or which have been received and accepted (Sec.
2-606).
Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., — Mass. —, 187 N.E.2d 669
(1963).
See the Annotation to Section 2-209, infra.
SECTION 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance
even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or
agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the
additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition
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 triat numerous decisions had estab-
lished that the intent to create si• ►
 an arbitration agreement must be
clearly established. Such an agreement cannot depend on conflicting
fine print in commercial forms. As a m r of law, there was no agree-
ment to arbitrate.
" g 'Although the Code was not in effect at the tim5of-tbiarilecklaeo r the
yt--Lcourt found Section 2-207 useful in its applaca.tio ►—to this problem. The
arbitration clause, whether viewed as a material alteration under sub-
section (2) or as a term nullified by conflicting provisions in the fermi-
(Goninient.--45-1., would not become part of the contract.
[Annotator's Commen • The approach of the court seems correct
in light of the market' eff c this provision would have on the normal
remedies for breach f c4ri ract. T e c urt limited its holding to the
	
application of the ar	 recognizing that a different
	
principle might gover 	 ring in the forms.]
SECTION 2-209. Modification, Rescission and Waiver.
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no
consideration to be binding.
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(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission
except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but
except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the
merchant must be separately signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article
(Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its
provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy
the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of
the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by
the other party that strict performance will be required of any term waived,
unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of posi-
tion in reliance on the waiver.
Skinner v. Taber Foreign Motors, Inc., — Mass. —, 187 N.E.2d 669
(1963).
A Connecticut resident purchased an airplane from a Massachu-
setts corporation. The bill of sale, installment contract and note were
executed in Massachusetts, and were of a type used in Connecticut,
which the seller believed to be necessary because the buyer lived in Con-
necticut and the plane was to be based there. The buyer agreed under
the contract to pay $200 per month for twenty-four months and
the balance on the twenty-fifth month. The plane was delivered
to the buyer, but before the first payment fell due, trouble developed
in the engine, which would cost $1,400 to repair or replace. To alleviate
buyer's difficulties, and rather than accept the return of the plane,
the seller orally agreed to lower the payments for the first year to $100
per month. The buyer agreed and installed a new motor. Five months
later, seller informed the buyer that the payments would have to be
increased to the original $200 per month or "he would have to take
action." The buyer continued to make the $100 payments. Without
demand for full payment, the seller repossessed the plane and caused
it to be sold at a sheriff's sale. The buyer then brought suit seeking
equitable replevin or damages. The master found the seller liable to the
buyer for the value of the plane less the balance of the purchase price.
On appeal, the court affirmed, answering the seller's main argu-
ment that Connecticut law should control by holding that the parties
had not agreed that Connecticut law should control and that the "trans-
action bore an appropriate relation to" Massachusetts since the transac-
tion was executed and the plane was delivered to the buyer in Massa-
chusetts, the law of which should govern under Section 1-105. Section
9-103 was held not to control since the dispute was not over the
validity of perfection of the security interest but involved the sales
aspects of the transaction under Article 2 as indicated in Section 2-102.
The seller also contended that the oral modification was invalid and
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unenforceable because it did not comply with the statute of frauds
(Section 2-201) and because it was not supported by consideration.
The court dismissed both arguments because the seller had not pleaded
the statute of frauds, and the modification required no consideration
under Section 2-209(1).
[Annotator's Comment: Although the court did not consider
the question of enforceability of the oral modification, it does raise a
perplexing problem. From subsection (3) and the Official Comment to
Section 2-209, it appears that to be enforceable, any modification of
a contract which is within the purview of Section 2-201 must itself
satisfy the statute of frauds requirements.
From the facts reported, it seems that this modification did not
satisfy these requirements. But, even if the seller had pleaded the
• statute of frauds, not all would have been lost for the buyer, for sub-
sections (4) and (5) of Section 2-209 causes an unenforceable modifica-
tion to operate as a waiver. In this instance, buyer could argue that the
oral modification, although unenforceable because of its failure to meet
the requirements of the statute of frauds, acted as a waiver of the
contract payment terms, and these were replaced by the payment terms
in the modification. This waiver was effective until seller retracted it by
reasonable notice. Buyer would concede seller's notifying him of his
retraction of the waiver, but he would rightly contend that, by the
seller's accepting two more payments under the terms of the modifica-
tion, the seller's retraction of the waiver lost its force. Hence, the
buyer was not in default since the terms of the modification controlled
until effectively retracted, and seller had no right to repossess the plane.
Had the seller not accepted any payments lower than the ones called
for in the sales contract after notifying buyer of his retraction of the
modification, the buyer would have been in default and the seller would
then have had the right to take possession of the plane.
Buyer also might have argued that neither Article 2 nor any other
article of the UCC governs the enforceability of the modification, be-
cause, in treating the modification as a separate transaction, it was
neither a sale of goods nor any type transaction which is covered by the
Code. This argument would win the battle but buyer would lose the
war, for the court would in all likelihood apply the common law of
contracts and hold the modification to be unenforceable as not being
supported by consideration, or, if consideration were found, the court
would hold it unenforceable by its noncompliance with the common law
statute of frauds.
The fact that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court so readily
accepted Section 1-105 and thereby applied Massachusetts law in this
well-reasoned opinion is an indication that the court is accepting the
Code in exchange for time-embedded concepts.]
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SECTION 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reason-
able opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose
and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
See the Annotation to Section 2-314, infra.
Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie Leg. J. 51 (1961).
See the Annotation to Section 2-316, infra.
SECTION 2-305. Open, Price Term.
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale
even though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable
price at the time for delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to
agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or
other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency
and it is not so set or recorded.
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price
for him to fix in good faith.
(3) When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement of the
parties fails to be fixed through fault of one party the other may at his
option treat the contract as cancelled or himself fix a reasonable price.
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the
price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there is no contract. In
such a case the buyer must return any goods already received or if unable
so to do must pay their reasonable value at the time of delivery and the
seller must return any portion of the price paid on account.
Republic-Odin Appliance Corp. v. Consumers Plumbing & Heating Sup-
ply Co., 45 Erie Leg. J. 121 (Pa. 1961).
This is a suit by the seller to recover the "price" of goods sold and
delivered to the buyer. The primary dispute was whether the buyer
was the defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation, or an Ohio corporation
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which had the same name and the same president as the defendant,
but which was not a party to this suit. In prior dealings, the plaintiff,
following instructions, sent to the Ohio corporation the original invoices
for goods ordered by and delivered to the defendant in Pennsylvania.
The Ohio corporation then made payment from vaguely separated
accounts in an Ohio bank. In deciding for the plantiff, the court, noting
that there was no agreed price for the goods delivered, relied on Sec-
tion 2-305 and inferred a reasonable price, which was amply evidenced
by plaintiff's catalogs which had formed the basis of pricing in prior
dealings.
SECTION 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of
Trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section
the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises
or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to he merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among
all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied war-
ranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
Plaintiff (buyer) purchased an automobile from White (dealer)
which was manufactured by Ford whose contract of sale, which em-
bodied the entire transaction, did not specifically exclude a warranty
of merchantability. New cars delivered by the manufacturer to the
dealer are operational and the dealer performs only "make ready"
service which includes tune-up, transmission adjustments, and state
inspection. Shortly after the car was delivered, the buyer noticed stiff-
ness in the steering. About one month later, when the car was given its
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1,000 mile check-up by the dealer, nothing defective was discovered in
the steering mechanism. A few days later, the, steering failed and this
resulted in the destruction of the car and serious injuries to the buyer.
Buyer brought an action against Ford for breach of warranty and
negligence. Ford joined the dealer as a third party defendant alleging
the dealer's negligence. The evidence indicated that the steering defect
was caused by a jam nut not properly secured by the manufacturer. The
jury, by special verdict, found that Ford was guilty of breach of war-
ranty and negligence, both being proximate causes of the accident;
that the dealer was guilty of negligence, which was the proximate cause
of the accident; and that the buyer was not contributorily negligent.
The court entered judgment against Ford with a right of contribution
against the dealer. Ford moved that the verdict should be set aside, and
the dealer moved that it should not be held liable to Ford for con-
tribution.
The court denied Ford's motion on the ground that Ford had
warranted the new car impliedly (Section 2-314) since it had not spe-
cifically excluded this warranty as provided by Section 2-316. Lack of
privity does not bar buyer's claim for breach of warranty or for negli-
gence. The court also found that the evidence supported the verdict.
On the other hand, the court granted dealer's motion and thereby
removed its duty of contribution to Ford. This consideration was based
on the fact that Ford could not recover from the dealer for negligence
in failing to discover and remedy the defect caused by Ford's own
negligence.
[Annotator's Comment: The buyer in the instant case chose to sue
Ford and was successful. Had he sued the dealer, Section 2-314 would
have raised the same implied warranty running from the dealer to the
seller. In that case, the dealer would probably have had the right of
indemnity from Ford based upon Ford's breach of implied warranty
(Section 2-314) to the dealer. This, at least, is implicit in Sections
2-607(5), 2-714 and 2-715(2).
The court mentioned that Ford did not specifically and con-
spicuously disclaim its warranty of merchantability in its contract as
provided in Section 2-316. It seems likely that if Ford did specifically
disclaim its implied warranty in strict compliance with Section 2-316,
the disclaimer would probably be disregarded by the court's invoking
Section 2-302. Two cases which indicate this result are Willman v.
American Motors, 44 Erie Leg. J. 51 (Pa. 1961) (annotated at Section
2-316, infra), and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960) (2 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 267 (1961)). In
these cases, the courts noted that the bargaining between an automobile
manufacturer and a buyer could not be at arm's length due to their
unequal positions and that such a disclaimer clause would be uncon-
scionable and against public policy. This language is a warning to
manufacturers that the court would invoke its power under Section
2-302 and disregard this "out."]
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Adams v. Scheib, 408 Pa. 452, 184 A.2d 700 (1962).
Consumer, who purchased raw pork sausage from a retailer, alleged
that she, several members of her family and guests contracted trichinosis
from eating the pork. Each brought an action for breach of implied
warranty. The retailer attempted to join wholesalers, who sold the
pork to the retailer, as additional defendants, but they were granted
compulsory nonsuits because the retailer failed to prove that the alleged
infected pork was from the pork purchased frOm them. In his charge,
the trial judge instructed the jury, at plaintiffs' request, that if plain-
tiffs bought pork from defendant, and if that pork was infected with
trichinae, the defendant breached his warranty and plaintiffs may
recover. The warranty that food is wholesome is implied irrespec-
tive of the defendant's knowledge of its diseased quality. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of retailer, and plaintiffs' motion for a new
trial was granted because the trial judge declared that the verdict was
against the evidence, the weight of the evidence, the law, and the charge
of the court.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the
verdict, holding that the charge, while erroneous, was favorable to the
plaintiffs and they had no cause to complain. The court stated that
under Section 2-314 an implied warranty did arise, but when applied
to the sale of raw pork, the jury must decide the added fact of whether
it was properly cooked. That this fact was not presented to the jury,
gave plaintiffs an undue advantage.
[Annotator's Comment: All goods which are impliedly warranted by
Section 2-314(c) must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are
used. By no means should this opinion be interpreted as limiting the
fitness requirement to the sale of raw pork.]
SECTION 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties.
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the
provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202)
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is
unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude
or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing
and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which
extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied war-
ranties are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all
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faults" or other language which in common understanding
calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or
has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty
with regard to defects which an examination ought in the cir-
cumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance
with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages
and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie Leg. J. 51 (Pa. 1961).
The purchaser brought an action for breach of implied warranty
of merchantability against the dealer and the manufacturer after his
automobile was destroyed in a fire caused by a faulty power brake
system. Although the manufacturer agreed in writing to replace any de-
fective part, it further stipulated that "this warranty [is] expressly in lieu
of all other warranties expressed or implied and of all other obligations or
liabilities on its part." The jury found for the plaintiff against both de-
fendants with liability over in favor of the dealer against the manu-
facturer. Chrysler Corporation, the manufacturer, moved for judgment
n.o.v. and a new trial alleging that the clause constituted a valid dis-
claimer of the implied warranty of merchantability.
The court held that a disclaimer clause must be sufficiently specific
to exclude a warranty which arises independently of the contract, such
as the warranty of merchantability. Although Section 2-316 (1953
version of the Code) establishes certain standards for excluding implied
warranties, the language of this clause did not include any of the ex-
pressions in Section 2-316(2)(a) nor did it adequately disclose to the
buyer that there was to be no implied warranty. The effective negation
of implied warranties requires either the use of statutory expressions
or clear and definitive words of exclusion.
.farnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959)
had clearly determined that the purchaser did not have to establish
privity in order to impose liability for breach of warranty against the
manufacturer.
[Annotator's Comment: In a footnote the court noted the possible
use of Section 2-302(1) in cases where the disclaimer provision sat-
isfies the requirements imposed by Section 2-316. Courts in sympathy
with a buyer who is compelled to accept a one-sided and oppressive con-
tract can strike the clause and thereby avoid "any unconscionable
result." The court cited Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) in which the New Jersey court held the same
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disclaimer clause to be against public policy and void as a matter of
law. The authors of the Code have utilized this public policy element in
Section 2-302.
But the Pennsylvania court was not forced to decide whether or
not the clause was unconscionable, for the disclaimer was inadequate
under the 1953 Code because it was not "specific." The same conclusion
would be reached under Section 2-316 of the 1958 Code because "mer-
chantability" was not expressly mentioned.]
Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
See the Annotation to Section 2-314, supra.
SECTION 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or
Implied.
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest
in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Hochgertet v. Canada Dry Corp., — Pa. —, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
The bartender of a fraternal organization was injured by flying
glass fragments when an unopened bottle of carbonated soda water,
located on a counter behind the bar, exploded. He sued the bottler on
grounds of breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. The lower
court sustained defendant's demurrer.
In affirming, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that, since
the bartender was neither in the family or houshold of the purchaser
nor a guest in his home, he was not one entitled to recover from a
remote seller under Section 2-318. The court declared that, although
prior cases had extended the warranty to sub-purchasers in the case of
food, further extension of the warranty beyond the immediate buyer
must come about through the efforts of the legislature. The court sug-
gested that plaintiff had an adequate remedy in an action for negligence.
[Annotator's Comment: The court in this case has impliedly over-
ruled important decisions on questions of privity in the superior and
federal district courts. In Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super.
422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959) and Thompson v. Reedman Motors Co., 199
F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961), each court abandoned the requirement
of privity between the respective plaintiff and defendant in actions for
breach of warranty. In the former case the buyer, and in the latter
case a guest passenger of the buyer, of an automobile were allowed
to bring an action for breach of warranty directly against the manufac-
turer. Both cases distinguished Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451
(1953), relied upon in the instant case, on the grounds that there the
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plaintiff, injured by an exploding bottle she had placed in her shopping
cart, had not yet purchased the product. The court in Thompson v.
Reedman, supra, expressly stated that it had no doubt that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania would reach its result so long as there had been
some purchase of the goods through which the plaintiff could claim.
While neither of these cases would be binding upon the Supreme
Court, they do represent the "developing case law" referred to in the
Official Comment to Section 2-318. Because of the notoriety and general
approval given to these cases, it is difficult to believe that the court
was unaware of them. However, the court blanketly stated, "In no
case in Pennsylvania has recovery against the manufacturer for breach
of an implied warranty been extended beyond a purchaser in the dis-
tributive chain. In fact, the inescapable conclusion from Loch v. Con-
fair . . . is that no warranty will be implied in favor of one who
is not in the category of a purchaser." (Emphasis by the court.) This
statement perhaps will save the decisions in Jarnot and Duckworth
v. Ford Motor Co., annotated supra, under Section 2-314, but will cast
a long shadow on the Reedman decision.
The now eroded privity doctrine was a creature of the courts at
a time when distribution of goods had little resemblance to modern
practices. This court states, however, that the legislature now has
the responsibility for altering that doctrine. The result may be an
unfortunate return to the decisions denying recovery to guests of the
actual buyers of food in restaurants or drive-ins. After all, these, as
well as guests in the home and members of the family, can reasonably be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.]
Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
See the Annotation to Section 2-314, supra.
ARTICLE 6: BULK TRANSFERS
SECTION 6-110. Subsequent Transfers.
When the title of a transferee to property is subject to a defect by
reason of his non-compliance with the requirements of this Article, then:
(1) a purchaser of any of such property from such transferee who
pays no value or who takes with notice of such non-compliance takes sub-
ject to such defect, but
(2) a purchaser for value in good faith and without such notice takes
free of such defect.
In the Matter of Dee's, Inc., 311 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1962).
This litigation was between two trustees in bankruptcy to deter-
mine in which bankrupt's estate property should be placed. Lewis
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